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Child Support as Labor Regulation
YIYoON CHUNG
University of Wisconsin-Madison
School of Social Work
The development of child support policy over the past three decades
provides an emblematic case study of the ways in which a new
policy that reflects the rise of moral arguments about individual and
family responsibility, once established, produces significant conse-
quences for both the economic sphere and political dialogues. I use
social control theory to examine a rarely appreciated consequence
of child support policies: labor regulation. Particularly, I demon-
strate the ways in which the discourse embedded in child support
has exalted the importance of work even under the lowest terms,
and has deflected public attention away from labor market issues.
Key words: child support, welfare, labor regulation, social control
theory, parental responsibility, social constructions, noncustodial
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The development of the child support system over the
past three decades provides an emblematic case study of the
ways in which a new policy that reflects the rise of moral ar-
guments about individual and family responsibility, once es-
tablished, produces significant consequences for both the eco-
nomic sphere and political dialogues. In this paper, I use social
control theory to examine a rarely appreciated economic and
political consequence of child support policies: labor regula-
tion. In addition, I describe the ways in which a view of family
that glorifies male bread-winners supporting their families
through paid work is enmeshed in this process.
Americans have experienced increasing inequality and
insecurity for the last three decades (Hacker, Mettler, & Soss,
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, September 2011, Volume XXXVIII, Number 3
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2007). Real wages have declined for younger and less-educat-
ed workers, and inequality in wages, income, and wealth have
grown sharply (APSA Task Force, 2004; Card & Dinardo, 2006;
DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, & Lee, 2006). Despite such economic
hardships, most changes in tax law and social policies have
reduced the government's role in providing opportunities and
security for poor and middle-class Americans, while expand-
ing the scope and size of benefits for the well-off (Hacker et
al., 2007). During the same period, the alleged lack of family
values and individual responsibility among the poor has in-
creasingly been at the forefront of the public policy agenda,
both as a primary cause of the nation's ills and as an area ripe
for reform. Within this context, public attention has been de-
flected away from new and pervasive economic insecurities
and inequalities and toward the poor as individuals.
Over the last few decades, as politicians, members of the
public, and scholars paid particular attention to welfare and
poverty issues and sought to account for the causes of per-
sistent poverty among single-mother families, noncustodial
fathers have increasingly been blamed for failing to fulfill their
parental responsibilities. For example, Mead (2007a) argued
that "low-income men, often the absent fathers of welfare fam-
ilies ... seldom work regularly, and this helps to keep families
poor." At the center of this trend, Americans have become fa-
miliar with images of deadbeat dads, men who are behind in
paying child support and who are portrayed as irresponsible
enough to leave their children in poverty. At the same time, the
construction of deadbeat dads was increasingly employed as
a representation of the nation's social problems. Noncustodial
fathers have not only been held morally responsible for their
children's poverty, but have even been described as criminal;
for example, in a 1996 speech, President Clinton compared
not paying child support to robbing a bank (U.S. Newswire,
1996).
In responding to this supposed epidemic of deadbeat
dads, federal and state governments have made increasing
efforts to enforce noncustodial fathers' parental responsibility
through child support policies. Among the enforcement laws,
the Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998 established new
categories of felony offenses that targeted fathers who were
not paying their child support, and enforced punishments of
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up to a 2-year prison term. Overall, child support policies have
become not only a political arena for expressing and empha-
sizing moral arguments about parental responsibility, but also
a site for offering specific enforcement tools to achieve moral
edicts.
In an era of persistent poverty and growing inequality,
however, questions remain regarding the effects of using child
support enforcement to increase the emphasis on parental re-
sponsibility. Following the passage of legislation such as the
Family Support Act of 1988, which required states to imple-
ment automatic wage withholding for child support payments
(Rothe, Ha, & Sosulski, 2004), child support is now automati-
cally deducted from fathers' paychecks; thus, these payments
are increasingly out of the fathers' control if their jobs are in the
formal labor market. At this point, fathers who do not pay full
child support are those who do not have formal earnings suf-
ficient for withholding. In fact, using data from the National
Survey of America's Families (NSAF), Sorensen and Zibman
(2001) estimated that 43 percent of all noncustodial fathers-
not only the noncustodial fathers of children on welfare-who
made no child support payments were poor themselves, even
when both formal and informal earnings were considered.
Nonetheless, over the past three decades, an increasing con-
nection has been drawn between parental responsibility and
child support; the assumption is that the primary cause of
non-payment is the noncustodial fathers' irresponsibility and
the appropriate policy to amend this problem is to increase en-
forcement of child support payments. Therefore, it is essential
to examine the specific ways in which child support policies as
a tool for promoting parental responsibility produce economic
and political consequences.
Social control theory, advanced by Piven and Cloward,
provides a framework to pursue such an investigation. In their
book Regulating the Poor, Piven and Cloward (1993) pointed
out two functions of welfare: (1) moderating political disor-
der by the expansion of its provision during periods of mass
protest; and (2) forcing the poor into the labor market by its
contraction and its degradation of welfare recipients after the
cessation of mass protests. This paper focuses on the period after
1974, when the United States began to develop and implement
a comprehensive federal child support policy, and when the
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occurrence of mass protests declined; therefore, I will focus on
the second function as I explain the functions of child support
as modeled on the welfare system. Piven and Cloward (1993)
demonstrated the economic and political functions of welfare
as a social control device in the labor market. Similarly, this re-
search examines the economic and political functions of child
support as labor regulation. Although much research on child
support has considered child support to be justified by moral
principles related to parental responsibility, the economic and
political consequences of the moral argument that is reinforced
by child support have been examined less thoroughly.
The application of social control theory to the case of
child support suggests that child support policies function to
regulate labor in two ways. First, child support enforcement
attempts to push noncustodial fathers into the labor market,
which, if successful, may over-populate the labor market and
decrease wages and working conditions for all employees.
However, since noncustodial fathers may disappear from the
labor market to avoid child support enforcement measures
such as income withholding, the actual effects of child support
enforcement on fathers' work might not be those intended by
child support policy. Indeed, the evidence for this first function
is inconsistent. However, even the failure of the first function is
support for social control theory as long as the second process
is operating.
The second way in which child support regulates labor
entails the symbolic dimension of child support policies. Child
support policies consolidate ideas that degrade noncustodial
fathers via attributing poverty among children primarily to
noncustodial fathers' misbehavior rather than to systemic
problems in the labor market or a lack of adequate social poli-
cies for families. In addition, child support policies promote a
view that emphasizes the value of a narrowly defined sense
of family autonomy in which male bread-winners support
their families through paid work, even in the context of the
lowest market rewards. The second manner of labor regulation
leads the general public to alienate these fathers, and therefore
deflects public attention away from insufficient labor market
opportunities for low- and moderate-income people; this, in
turn, leads to a lack of support for anti-poverty programs and
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a lack of labor-friendly policy. Taken together, these result in
the decline of productive labor regulation, particularly with
respect to wages, working conditions, and both the bargaining
power and political mobilization of labor.
The functions of child support I consider in this paper
are true of all child support, but I focus on the relationship
between the child support system and noncustodial fathers of
children who have been on welfare, and consider the broader
impacts of this relationship. Such particular attention does not
lead to an overly narrow focus, because the majority of cases
of child support enforcement have been for fathers who are
associated with current or former welfare recipients. This has
always been true, although the proportions of children who
have been on welfare among child support enforcement case-
loads have continually dropped between 1975 and 2007, from
nearly all cases in 1975 to 60 percent in 2007 (Office of Child
Support Enforcement [OCSE], 2008).
Furthermore, the historical development of child support
policy justifies the explicit restriction of the paper's focus:
federal child support policy was created as part of the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC), and
child support enforcement originated out of a concern for re-
couping a portion of government expenditures for welfare
(Abramovitz, 1988; Cancian & Meyer, 2004). Finally, even
though child support enforcement now reaches a greater
proportion of noncustodial fathers whose children have not re-
ceived welfare, researchers argue that child support, because it
started and was developed as part of welfare, entails regula-
tions that are invasive of privacy and punitive to all families
who receive the services (Brito, 1999). Thus, the link of child
support to families on welfare is a crucial starting point from
which to explore the function of child support.
This paper shares common ground with previous re-
search that examines factors affecting child support outcomes,
often in conjunction with welfare (Cancian & Meyer, 2004,
2006; Carlson, Garfinkel, McLanahan, Mincy, & Primus, 2004;
Freeman & Waldfogel, 1998; Garfinkel, Miller, McLanahan,
& Hanson, 1998; Sorensen & Zibman, 2001), and with
research that focuses on the social control functions of welfare
(Abramovitz, 1988; Gordon, 1990; Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990;
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Piven & Cloward, 1993). Social control theory has been applied
to the areas of welfare and incarceration, but has been utilized
less in the study of child support, so understanding child
support through the lens of social control theory is an impor-
tant contribution of this research. While I use the first body of
literature mentioned above-consisting primarily of empiri-
cal studies-to draw support for the claims I make, many of
the studies take different perspectives on the system and have
different theoretical backgrounds. Therefore, this research sets
out to bridge these two bodies of study by explaining how
child support functions to regulate labor.
Additionally, in explaining the second way in which child
support policies function as labor regulation, the study consid-
ers moral arguments about parental responsibility embedded
in child support. In order to expand the scope of this second
process, this study expands on another body of research that
investigates the symbolic dimensions of policies (Crowley,
Watson, & Waller, 2008; Fineman, 2004; Schneider & Ingram,
1997; Soss, 2005; Stone, 1989).
Reconceptualizing the function of child support as labor
regulation does not suggest that the ideas of either child
support or labor regulation are in themselves negative. Indeed,
all societies regulate labor at different levels, and, given dif-
ferent settings and policy designs, child support might have
supported the labor of noncustodial fathers. Instead, the
argument is that child support is not limited to its previously
perceived functions: saving money for the government; reduc-
ing poverty among single-mother families; and enhancing pa-
rental responsibility. Among the advantages an insight into the
regulating function of child support provides, are developing a
perspective on the structural causes of inequality and poverty
and initiating the first step toward vigorous discussions about
labor policies that are supportive of those who have low or
moderate means.
Three Perceived Functions of Child Support
Before demonstrating the function of child support as labor
regulation in the following section, in this section I outline the
multiple, sometimes conflicting, functions of child support
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policy that have been recognized by policy makers, scholars,
and the general public. This will provide a sense of what is
missing in the current discussion of the function of child
support policy. It is often assumed that child support policy
functions, or at least ideally should function, in one of three
primary ways: (1) saving money for the government; (2) alle-
viating poverty among single-mother families; or (3) enforcing
parental responsibilities of noncustodial parents for their bio-
logical children (Josephson, 1997; Waller & Plotnick, 2001).
Saving Money for Governments
Many researchers have pointed out that reducing the cost
of governmental expenditures on welfare was the primary
goal of the federal child support program at its creation
in 1974, and has always been a significant goal (Brito, 1999;
Josephson, 1997; Solomon, 1982). The government set out
to save money directly by retaining all or most of the child
support paid on behalf of welfare recipients (savings are
measured by the government's share of collections minus
overall expenditures). The initial federal child support
program (enacted in 1975) was almost entirely limited to
families receiving AFDC, and all the child support payments
made on behalf of these families were retained by the govern-
ment. In fact, between 1975 and 1988, the government realized
direct savings via child support.
However, the child support system has expanded to include
an increasing number of non-welfare cases; as a result, since
1989 the government's expenditures on child support enforce-
ment have exceeded the child support collections the govern-
ment has retained. This change in the child support budget
reflects, and also leads to, a shift in child support policies from
a direct money-saving device to a social service program that
can be justified by other social functions despite its net positive
spending. Despite this change, the child support system still
has another component of saving money for tax payers that
is the indirect savings that can be realized by helping some
welfare recipients get off welfare and by preventing many oth-
erwise poor single mothers from entering the welfare system.
In this paper, however, I do not discuss these indirect savings
extensively because, to the extent that the child support system
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shifts toward serving as a social service program, the indirect
savings cannot be the sole justification or measure of success;
the effect of child support in reducing poverty among single-
mother families must also be taken into consideration (Kurz &
Hirsch, 2003).
Alleviating Poverty among Single-Mother Families
Members of the general public, as well as many schol-
ars, believe that child support does, or at least should, alle-
viate poverty among single-mother families (Meyer & Hu,
1999; Nichols-Casebolt, 1986, 1992; Waller & Plotnick, 2001).
Nonetheless, because welfare recipients have been required to
sign over their rights to child support to the state, much of the
child support paid by fathers of children receiving welfare has
been withheld by governments and has not been transferred
to families. Although the proportion of child support enforce-
ment caseloads associated with mothers currently receiving
welfare dropped from 85 percent in 1977 to 14 percent in 2007
(OCSE, 2008), because these mothers constitute one of the most
vulnerable and poorest groups in society, the states' practices
toward this population are still an important consideration in
assessing the function of child support as a device to reduce
poverty among single-mother families. In addition, in 2007,
60 percent of child support enforcement caseloads were cases
where custodial mothers received welfare (14 percent of current
and 46 percent of former welfare recipients), and at least some
child support payments made on behalf of their children were
diverted to the government. Given the government practices
toward single-mother families receiving welfare, poverty re-
duction seems to be neither a consistent nor a primary justifi-
cation of child support policy (Cancian & Meyer, 2004; Hirsch,
1988; Pate, 2002).
Despite this, some observers argue that child support does
reduce poverty among children because most child support
paid on behalf of children not receiving welfare is actually
passed through to the custodial-parent families. Further, it has
often been claimed, as by Harris, that many families would
no longer be poor and, consequently, would not need welfare,
if child support were paid (Josephson, 1997). Finally, many
researchers have supported the positive potential of child
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support to reduce poverty among single-mother families by
reporting that noncustodial fathers could provide more, based
on the average earnings for all noncustodial fathers, not just
those associated with children receiving welfare (Garfinkel et
al., 1998; Sorensen, 1997).
However, there has been skepticism about the effective-
ness of child support as a fundamental solution to poverty
among single-mother families. First, although not all noncus-
todial fathers are poor, a significant portion of the noncusto-
dial fathers who do not pay child support are poor (Sorensen
& Zibman, 2001). Second, research in the area has reported
many barriers facing noncustodial fathers, in particular fathers
of children receiving welfare, as they attempt to comply with
the child support system. Cancian and Meyer (2004) showed
that, among noncustodial fathers of children receiving welfare
in Wisconsin, only about one in five had an education beyond
high school. Furthermore, in their qualitative analysis, Crowley
et al. (2008) reported that fathers of children on welfare often
resided within neighborhoods with high crime and incarcera-
tion rates and rampant societal racism. Using data on all fathers
of nonmarital children-not only the fathers of nonmarital chil-
dren on welfare-Chung (2011) estimated that over 10 percent
were in prison more than 12 months between the child's birth
and age five. Given the limited income potential and environ-
mental constraints of many noncustodial fathers, the effects of
strengthening child support enforcement on poverty reduction
among single-mother families may not be significant enough
to justify the costs to fathers.
Indeed, research has indicated the limitations of the actual
and potential roles of child support in reducing poverty among
children. The high rates of post-child-support poverty found
in previous studies (see Cancian & Meyer, 2006; Sorensen &
Zibman, 2001) may indicate not only the alleged failure of
child support enforcement, but also the limited potential of
private child support as a device to reduce poverty among
single-mother families. Sorensen and Wheaton (1994) esti-
mated that even if all custodial mothers had child support
awards and received full child support (while holding current
awards levels constant), poverty among single-mother fami-
lies would fall by just 3 percent. Given this context, even when
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child support obligations are effectively enforced among non-
custodial fathers, the high poverty rate among single-mother
families in the United States would be insoluble and far higher
than the poverty rates for their counterparts in many European
countries (Christopher, 2002). In sum, the second perceived
function of child support-the reduction of poverty among
single-mother families-appears to be undermined by a range
of factors within the child support system.
Enforcing Parental Responsibility
The moral argument about parental responsibility of non-
custodial parents not only motivated the creation of the federal
child support program in 1975 and subsequent enforcement
tools, but also gained increasing attention in the discussion of
child support. From this perspective, and given the earlier find-
ings that direct savings via child support have not been real-
ized since 1989 and that the reduction of poverty has not been
the primary focus of child support, it is reasonable to claim
that parental responsibility appears to be the most consistent
justification for child support policy.
While in the previous two subsections, I discussed whether
the first two perceived functions of child support have worked
effectively, I do not attempt to answer the question of whether
child support enforcement actually promotes parental respon-
sibility. It is because neither a negative nor a positive answer to
the question would undermine the main point: it is important
to investigate the economic and political consequences of em-
phasizing the moral argument about parental responsibility
that is embedded in and reinforced by child support policies.
Despite their importance, these consequences have rarely been
examined.
Emphasizing the norm of fathers' financial responsibilities
through child support enforcement has different effects across
class and race. From its inception, the child support enforce-
ment system has been disproportionately aimed at the poor,
particularly poor men of color (despite the trend over time
for the system to move away from focusing only on the poor).
First, child support enforcement has produced more negative
consequences for low-income fathers than for high-income
fathers. Low-income fathers have been more likely than
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high-income fathers to be subject to the formal child support
enforcement system (Lyon, 1999). This is due in great part
to the fact that low-income fathers are likely to partner with
mothers receiving welfare, and these mothers are required to
participate in the formal child support program. Child support
enforcement has led to more regulatory and punitive conse-
quences for low-income noncustodial fathers, not only because
the formal child support enforcement system restricts and
regulates the means of support and the timing of payments,
but also because child support enforcement tools are puni-
tive, even to the point of involving incarceration. Furthermore,
low-income noncustodial fathers tend to receive child support
orders constituting a higher proportion of their income, and
thus face larger burdens than those with high incomes (Cancian
& Meyer, 2006; Turetsky, 2000).
In addition to low-income fathers, child support enforce-
ment has had disproportionate impacts on men of color.
This is in part because, as described earlier, the child support
system disadvantages payers with low incomes, and minor-
ity noncustodial fathers tend to have lower incomes than their
white counterparts. Further, the fact that the amounts in child
support orders often remain unadjusted while fathers are in
prison disproportionately affects men of color because incar-
ceration rates for minorities have been disproportionately high
(Mauer, 1997; Pettit & Western, 2004; Western, 2006; Western
& McLanahan, 2000). Given these trends, it is clear that, even
though race has seldom appeared overtly in the discussion
about child support, emphasizing the seemingly race-neutral
concept of parental responsibility and strengthening and
adding punitive enforcement tools to the child support system
produce disproportionate consequences for men of color.
Many scholars go even further and argue that the child
support policy has actually been racially motivated (Hansen,
1999; Maldonado, 2006). Hansen (1999, p. 1123) argues that one
of the most important characteristics of modern child support
is "a racially inflected blaming of African-American fathers."
Because deadbeat dads have often been pictured as African
American men, the child support argument that blames
deadbeat dads serves to point toward African American men
as a small, but visible, troubling group whose misbehaviors
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are both a cause of the national problem and a target for gov-
ernmental reform. Therefore, blaming noncustodial fathers for
their children's poverty and drawing on child support as the
solution may result in the condemnation of minority noncus-
todial fathers.
Without mentioning class and race, child support, by fo-
cusing on parental responsibility, has permitted people to
talk about whether and how society should force low-income
fathers, particularly low-income fathers of color, to work. From
this perspective, the economic and political effects of the child
support system reach not only those officially enrolled in the
system, but also society members who are economically disad-
vantaged and/or racial minorities. Building on these observa-
tions and embracing social control theory, in the next section
I provide a further, perhaps more critical, insight: the scope of
those who bear the economic and political consequences of the
child support system encompasses all workers. As explained
in the following section, labor regulation is at the heart of this
political process.
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework of Ways in Which Child
Support Policies Lead to Labor Regulation
Pushing noncustodial Wages &
fathers of children o working terms
welfare into the labor Populating the declineT market through child labor market
support enforcement
tools Bargaining
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Child Support as Labor Regulation
The application of social control theory to the child support
system suggests two ways in which child support can lead to
labor regulation. Figure 1 illustrates these two processes: one
occurs through the attempts to enforce fathers' labor market
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participation and the other occurs through discursive prac-
tices, reflecting and reinforcing negative social constructions
of noncustodial fathers and a specific set of meanings about
family.
Pushing Poor Noncustodial Fathers into the Labor Market
The major income source of noncustodial fathers of chil-
dren receiving welfare is earnings; therefore, enforcing
payment translates into enforcing work. The underlying as-
sumption of child support policy is that child support enforce-
ment will lead fathers to work. Some child support enforce-
ment tools require fathers who are behind in child support to
seek jobs and to report their job search records to the agency
on a regular basis (with a consequence of incarceration in the
case of non-compliance). Additionally, a great deal of research
has focused on testing the effects of child support policy on
fathers' work activities (Cancian, Heinrich, & Chung, 2009;
Freeman & Waldfogel, 1998; Holzer, Offner, & Sorensen, 2005;
Rich, Garfinkel, & Gao, 2007).
Although the perspective that child support as a policy
concerns noncustodial fathers' work is not new, social control
theory offers further insights into the hypothetical, and mostly
ignored, effects of child support on the broader labor market.
If child support successfully pushes noncustodial fathers into
the labor market, this might tighten the labor market, which
would result in a declining general wage rate and worsening
working conditions in the labor market (Piven & Cloward,
1993). The law of supply and demand predicts that if the
supply of labor increases, wages can be expected to fall. In
particular, the degradation of wages and benefits would have
particularly strong consequences for those who work in low-
wage labor markets, since these markets are where many of
the noncustodial fathers whom the child support enforcement
system targets for enforcement are likely to seek and find
jobs (Cancian & Meyer, 2006; Sorensen & Zibman, 2001). As
a policy affecting labor market conditions, child support will
be counterproductive if it weakens the working conditions of
workers in low-wage labor markets. Of all those in the labor
market, this group has experienced the greatest decline in eco-
nomic rewards since the 1970s (Sum, Khatiwada, McLaughlin,
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& Palma, forthcoming); therefore, the potentially negative con-
sequences of child support enforcement for this group should
be of particular concern.
In addition, Piven and Cloward (1993) explore the conse-
quences of an increased labor supply for the bargaining power
of workers. Their explanation focuses on the Marxist idea of a
reserve army of labor, which basically refers to the unemployed
individuals in a capitalist society (Piven & Cloward, 1993, p.
355). The authors claim that capitalists use this population to
weaken and divide the working class. When the labor market
is saturated with people seeking jobs, employees are less likely
to boldly demand better wages and working conditions from
employers due to the fear of being replaced by someone in that
pool. Therefore, if child support successfully compels more
noncustodial fathers of children receiving welfare to search for
jobs, to enter the labor market, and to work more, the copious
supply of labor will function as a threat to the economic
security of a broader range of workers, while serving the inter-
ests of employers.
However, as Piven and Cloward (1993) point out, the
attempt to regulate labor often meets with resistance. Hence,
child support becomes both a site of labor regulation (in terms
of the government enforcing child support payments) and a
site of resistance to the regulation by the noncustodial fathers.'
Income withholding has been the most popular and effec-
tive method used by states to enforce child support payments
(Rothe et al., 2004). In response, poor noncustodial fathers may
disappear from the formal labor market in order to prevent
their earnings from being discovered and withheld by the gov-
ernment (Holzer et al., 2005). Some may take jobs in the under-
ground economy.
In spite of the fathers' resistance, however, the government
has developed ways to enhance enforcement, such as seizing
property, revoking driving and professional licenses, and even
incarcerating those who are behind in paying child support
(Rothe et al., 2004). All of these enforcement methods may
work as threats to push noncustodial fathers to work in order
to pay child support. However, once any of the enforcement
tools are utilized, it may make securing employment more dif-
ficult for noncustodial fathers.
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Not surprisingly, given this context, studies have reported
conflicting results about the effects of child support enforce-
ment on fathers' labor market outcomes. Using data from the
Survey of Income and Program Participation, Freeman and
Waldfogel (1998) found positive effects of child support en-
forcement on noncustodial fathers' employment in the formal
labor market. Using data from the Fragile Families and Child
Wellbeing Study, Rich et al. (2007) found marginally positive
effects of states' child support enforcement on all noncusto-
dial fathers' formal work hours. In contrast, in a multivariate
analysis using both individual- and state-level data, Holzer
et al. (2005) found that child support enforcement decreased
employment activity among black men ages 25-34. Cancian,
Heinreich, and Chung (2009) reported that higher levels of
child support arrears (followed by child support enforcement)
reduced formal earnings, particularly for those who had con-
sistent work histories.
If the contrasting efforts of government regulation and
fathers' resistance to these regulations cancel one another out
and result in fathers' disappearance from the labor market,
child support enforcement would not necessarily intensify
competition for low-paying jobs and subsequently cheapen
labor. However, the failure of the child support system in
pushing noncustodial fathers into the labor market is not con-
tradictory to, but provides support for, social control theory.
Piven and Cloward (1993, p. 381) made the point that welfare
programs, which seem to have failed because they have not
successfully pushed single mothers into the work force, have,
in fact, succeeded because "they helped communicate mean-
ings which reinforced labor discipline." Similarly, I argue
that, in addition to investigating the direct mode of pushing
noncustodial fathers into the labor market, it is necessary to
examine other, indirect ways that child support policies func-
tion to regulate labor. Specifically, it is imperative to examine
the rhetorical practices that, in order to sanctify the virtue of
work no matter the terms, reflect and reinforce both a specific
set of meanings about family and the negative social construc-
tions of noncustodial fathers.
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Degrading Noncustodial Fathers of Children Receiving Welfare
In order to assess the nuances of the symbolic dimension of
child support, I consider the moral arguments about parental
responsibility as a discourse that has been entrenched in child
support policies, and take advantage of research that focuses
on the symbolic dimension of policies. Discourse, as a social
theory, was first introduced by Foucault (1973, 1995; Foucault
& Gordon, 1980), and has been elaborated in many different
ways by post-structuralists (Hiemstra, 2004). The working def-
inition of discourse employed in this paper is a set of closely
related meanings that not only are affected by existing power
relations but also actively create power relations. A discourse
embedded within a policy may reinforce itself via its influence
on specific policy rules and the social construction of target
populations.
Particularly, I consider the moral argument about parental
responsibility embedded in child support policies as part of
a discourse about family. The family discourse unfolds as an
attempt to pin down the boundaries, role, and importance of
family (i.e., an autonomous family = one man, one woman, and
biological children, in which men should work and provide for
the family). Even when the family form does not match the
ideal within the family discourse-i.e., fathers are not living
with children-the clearest norm enforced in child support
is the financial responsibility of biological parents to support
their own children through paid work.
The family discourse reinforces itself via its influence on
the operation of child support policies. Child support enforce-
ment tools include various public rituals that degrade noncus-
todial fathers and therefore affirm the family discourse. Child
support policy scrutinizes noncustodial fathers' behaviors
such as work, fertility, and even sexual relationships with their
female partners, and places their behaviors on the agenda of
public arguments. In addition, child support enforcement de-
grades noncustodial fathers by treating non-payers as crimi-
nals. Such policy rituals exalt the importance of a bread-winner
supporting his family members through paid work even when
market rewards are low. From this perspective, the irony of
incarcerating fathers for non-payment (incarceration does not
help them support their children and even prevents them from
doing so, and in addition is costly to the government) begins
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to make sense; the ritual of incarcerating non-payers affirms
the family discourse and exalts the importance of work at any
terms.
The family discourse that the child support system embrac-
es sends a set of negative messages about noncustodial fathers
of children receiving welfare. Of the two messages I consider
in this paper, the first is that noncustodial fathers of children
receiving welfare fail to achieve autonomy. In the philosophi-
cal and political rhetoric concerning poverty, autonomy is one
of the core tenets that Americans espouse (Ellwood, 1988).
In most discussions, autonomy is narrowly defined as being
accountable for oneself and one's dependents via paid labor
(Fineman, 2004, p. 9). In this vision, autonomy is assumed to be
attainable by every individual/family, so the failure to achieve
autonomy is often attributed to the moral defects of individu-
als, such as laziness and irresponsibility.
In his discussion of autonomy, Ellwood (1988, p. 16) ex-
plained that Americans believe that they have a significant
degree of control over their destinies, and that any individual
willing to make the necessary sacrifices can provide for him-
or herself. Fathers of children receiving welfare are viewed as
lacking the determination to do what is required. Mead (2007a)
summarized the alleged deterioration of the work ethic among
the poor: "many cannot endure the slights and disappoint-
ments that work involves. That's why poor men usually can
obtain jobs yet seldom keep them." The failure of noncustodial
fathers to achieve economic autonomy is often identified as the
alternative side of the problem of dependency, both their own
and the dependency of families on welfare. This concept of the
autonomy of family flows through the rest of the discursive
practices surrounding child support.
Noncustodial fathers are consistently degraded by causal
stories that assert that the fathers are the cause of poverty among
single-mother families. Stone (1989) defines a causal story as a
discourse that describes harms and difficulties, attributes their
causes and responsibilities to the actions of other individuals
or organizations, and invokes society's power to stop the harm.
The causal story maintained by the child support system tells
the general public that the poverty of single-mother families is
caused by noncustodial parents' irresponsibility and refusal to
work or to get married (Mead, 1993, 2007b; Rector, 2001). Mead
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(2007a) claimed that the fathers of children receiving welfare
seldom work regularly, and this "helps to keep families poor."
Rector (2001, p. 63) argued that "the collapse of marriage is
the principal cause of child poverty and a host of other social
ills." The flip side of such causal stories is the assumption that
poverty could be reduced by enforcing the parental respon-
sibility of noncustodial parents (e.g., enforcing child support
payments and work). The causal story, reinforced by a narrow-
ly defined concept of autonomy, is used to call for government
intervention in the alleged problems. The outcome is puni-
tive child support enforcement, which continues to encourage
the transmission of the messages that further degrade these
fathers.
Because the discursive practices surrounding child support
both create negative constructions of noncustodial fathers and
reinforce the existing negative views of them, these fathers are
more likely to be seen as irresponsible noncustodial parents of
poor children than as a group of disadvantaged citizens who
need help from society. Degrading images of noncustodial
fathers of children receiving welfare establish the belief that
these men are morally deficient and are not on equal standing
with the general public, especially with regard to social rights
and governmental concern and support. Consequently, the
members of the general public tend to alienate these fathers.
In this process of alienation, these fathers are singled out, rec-
ognized as a troubled group due to their specific behaviors
(non-work or non-marriage), and used as a symbol of national
ills. The failures of the economic system are occluded by this
moral discourse, which places the responsibility for poverty
on a small but visible group. As Piven (1995, p. xiii) noted, the
blame placed on poor individuals functions to "divert wide-
spread public discontent over the shocks of economic decline
and changing social mores."
The pervasive influence of the family discourse, strength-
ened through child support policies, has weakened policies
that benefit the working class. For example, Fineman (2004,
p. 271) suggested a broader concept of autonomy-allow-
ing choice to be made and to be meaningful. This broadened
concept of autonomy calls for governments to ensure that
each individual has the basic necessary resources to realize
autonomy. However, the moral argument embedded in the
90
Child Support as Labor Regulation
discussion of parental responsibility via child support has ex-
cluded any discussion of this broader sense of autonomy. In
addition, Stone (1989, p. 298) pointed out that causal stories can
construct shared risk and benefit factors among a certain group
of people, who may not have natural associations without the
causal story, and therefore can mobilize them to take certain
collective actions. Conversely, the moral argument concerning
child support has encouraged divided alliances between non-
custodial parents of poor children and others, in particular di-
viding noncustodial fathers from the rest of the working class.
The child support discourse has resulted in altering the
working class's perception of their collective interests and
the goals of political mobilization. Piven and Cloward (1993)
emphasized that the working class has a stake in increasing
its bargaining power with employers in support of systemic
anti-poverty programs (including active labor policies and ex-
panded cash and in-kind benefits for low-income families, re-
gardless of family formation). They claimed that when people
had an alternative means of income, they were not as likely
to accept degrading forms of work that would not improve
their situation. However, the child support discourse may
reduce the interests of the working class in welfare programs
and persuade them to oppose policies that are in their inter-
est (Piven & Cloward, 1993). Emphasizing parental responsi-
bility via child support has occluded the true nature of social
problems in U.S. society. It has often masked the necessity of
government support for low- and moderate-wage workers in
the labor market and collective provisions for families with
children. This obfuscation has thwarted beneficial initiatives
put forth by labor organizations, which, in turn, has reduced
wages and work benefits and decreased the power of labor to
bargain with employers; in other words, it has resulted in the
decline of the productive regulation of labor.
Conclusion
This paper examined three perceived functions of child
support: saving money for the government, alleviating
poverty in single-mother families, and enforcing parental
responsibilities. Although the child support enforcement
program experienced net gains between 1975 and 1988, the
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government no longer saves money directly via the program.
In addition, as shown above, child support has not effectively
reduced poverty among children. The system has focused pri-
marily on punitive enforcement tools and has provided few
devices to help these fathers work and pay child support.
Although the limitations of child support as a solution for
poverty among single-mother families are obvious, the gov-
ernment has favored rhetoric at the expense of practical ac-
complishments, such as improving the status of the most im-
poverished and weakest groups in society, while increasing
spending on the administration of moral initiatives. The moral
goal and approach of child support could be a method of sup-
porting other goals such as reducing poverty among children
living in single-mother families; however, as the current analy-
sis demonstrates, this is not the case.
Although it may seem morally right for fathers to support
their children, I focus on the fact that the rhetoric of parental
responsibility itself has not proven to be very successful in en-
couraging fathers to perform that role. Even if it is true that
responsible fathers are more likely to support their children,
the literature has found that enforcing the respohsibility does
not, as a policy, work. Criticizing the behavior of noncustodial
fathers of children receiving welfare is limited as a solution to
poverty. For example, poverty can be exacerbated by fathers'
withdrawal of informal support for their children and some
fathers' withdrawal from the formal labor market, and by the
reduction of anti-poverty programs due to reduced public
support. Moreover, the entire working class is hurt by policies
based on this moral discourse. Such policies lead to division
and the devaluation of labor by attributing poverty to misbe-
havior and by taking attention away from the importance of
anti-poverty programs and labor-friendly policies.
Poverty in recent decades has been caused by economic
downturns and increased social inequality, and therefore
cannot be resolved only by the horizontal redistribution of
money from often poor fathers to relatively poorer mothers.
Both welfare policy for single-mother families and the child
support system should be revised. First, the connection
between welfare and child support should be severed. In this
scenario, welfare mothers would not have to assign their right
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to child support to the state, and they would not have to coop-
erate with the child support system by identifying the child's
father as a pre-condition for receiving public aid. All or most
of the paid child support should be transferred to custodial-
mother families. Additionally, the incentives of public aid such
as Food Stamps or Medicaid, and the Earned Income Tax Credit
should be extended to fathers with moderate or poor means
who try to pay child support (Cancian & Meyer, 2006; Castillo,
2009; Mincy, Klempin, & Schmidt, 2010; Wheaton & Sorenson,
2009). In order to help single-mother families avoid economic
hardship, child support assurance-a government guarantee
of child support-should be considered (Cancian & Meyer
2006). Furthermore, it is important to recognize that a signifi-
cant labor force is necessary for society and that maintaining a
continuous labor force requires rearing children. Consequently,
society should generally value and support families' efforts to
rear children. Given that, family allowances-universal pay-
ments from government to families with children, regardless
of family formation-could be considered.
Importantly, examining the ways in which child support
regulates labor offers the insight that child support enforce-
ment has had negative economic and political effects on the
poor, the working class, and the labor market. If child support
is seen as a labor policy aimed at the poor, in particular poor
men of color, as I claim in this paper, labor-supportive devices
in the child support system are obviously needed. In order
to help poor parents perform their parental roles, more than
moral admonition is needed. Rather, the reduction of poverty
by collective provision is the larger solution.
A collective solution includes creating employment oppor-
tunities that provide both enough income for a decent standard
of living and job-related benefits. Investments into social ser-
vices such as health care, education, and job-training programs
would also be important factors in this type of solution. Given
the innumerable ways in which the poor are disadvantaged
in the United States, researchers interested in policy options
for improving the fortunes of less-skilled workers should
look beyond outcomes related to fathers' behaviors-that is,
compliance rates within the child support system and mar-
riage and work patterns among the poor-which are the
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customary dependent variables in much of the literature. In
order to reduce poverty, future research should investigate
the effectiveness of policy interventions in the labor market.
In addition, research should explore which other forms of
income-maintenance programs, such as family allowances,
would effectively reduce poverty among single-mother fami-
lies. Future research should also provide an empirical exami-
nation of the theoretical arguments concerning the function of
child support in the regulation of labor that are included in the
current paper.
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(Endnotes)
1. The comments of Joe Soss were particularly helpful in developing
this argument.
2. Between 1975 and 1984, all child support paid on behalf of
children on welfare was retained by the government in order to
compensate for costs of welfare (Sorensen & Halpern, 2000).
However, after 1984, the federal government required states
to transfer the first $50 of child support received each month
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to the family on welfare, and disregard that amount in the
determination of welfare benefits. The Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) in 1996 lifted this mandate;
consequently, as of 2007, twenty-six states chose not to pass through
any child support to families on welfare (Center for Law and Social
Policy, 2007).

